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RoleofScientific Data in Health Decisions
by Sheldon W. Samuels*
Ihe distinction between reality and models or methodological assumptions is necessary for an under-
standingoftheuseofdata-economic, technicalorbiological -indecision-making. Thetraditional modes
ofanalysis used in decisions are discussed historically and analytically. Utilitarian-based concepts such as
cost-benefitanalysisandcannibalistic concepts such as"acceptable risk" arerejected onlogical and moral
grounds. Historical realitysuggests theconceptofsociallynecessary riskdetermined through thedialectic
process in democracy.
The dependence of those who make decisions in
thefields ofpublic, environmental and occupational
health on concepts borrowed from other sciences
and applied with poorly contrived modifications re-
sults in unnecessary barriers to the development of
methods appropriate to a health science.
The consequence is that when the call comes for
decisions made on some kind of rational basis, the
healthpractitionerfinds himselfintheposition ofthe
hound who must lean against the wall in order to
bark.
In the recent decision on OSHA's benzene stan-
dard(1), theCourtofAppeals wasconvinced thatthe
agency ought to quantify what cannot be quantified
(the health benefits) and to compare these values
with incommensurable values derived from eco-
nomic data. The intellectual errors are not those of
the court alone. Those ofus who participated in the
hearings conducted by the agency - labor, man-
agement, public interest organizations and govern-
ment - failed to construct an alternative mode of
analysis.
In the recent estimate of the fraction of cancer
attributable tooccupation (2), the contributors point
to the importance of a methodological error which
can result in a gross underestimation (1-5%) of the
occupationally-related fraction. When "the fallacy
of'one effect - one cause' explanations" is recog-
nizedandcorrectlyreplacedby the conceptofmulti-
ple "factors," the value at issue becomes "at least
2%o."
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The frequently unheuristic use of "models," ex-
planatory concepts, wo.rking hypotheses, sys-
tematizing statements and other methodological
conveniences stems in great part from the recurrent
arrogance that considers philosophic analysis as
something distinct from and unrelated to what is
called "science." Yet, because explanation is im-
possible in terms of"science" alone, we either con-
struct orunconsciously assume a crude metaphysic,
or accept uncritically handed down systems.
The fault of scientists and their educators? The
faultofanintrovertish periodofphilosophic inquiry?
Regardless offault, we are in the difficulty offinding
thatwhat so many call word-quibbling orconsiderto
be "just semantics" should be so vital to the prog-
ress ofour science. Yet we are not prepared to deal
with these philosophic issues.
The lack ofunity and clarity of principles and the
cobweb ofterminological inconsistencies in the field
ofhealth decision-making prevent us from develop-
ing a systematized body of propositions or at least
understandings, i.e., a specialized science.
A specialized science with this charge draws its
datafrom perceptions ofour mores, our politics, the
laboratory, the field, the clinic and our personal and
social values. Decisions are being made and these
data are being collected, but the distinct threads we
perceive form no rational pattern, only a knot.
Part of the problem is that we train many spe-
cialized scientists, but few general scientists. The
consequence is thatwe havedifficulty inprogressing
beyond what Whitehead (3) would have called a
"medley of ad hoc hypotheses," because philo-
sophic criticism seldom occurs diligently and with
discipline.
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decision-makers explains their conclusions in terms
ofa system ofassumptions formed in their science.
The explanations often lose meaning because the
meaning is understood by going outside that system.
Theconceptual doors to alternative explanations are
closed because the assumption "works" forthe pur-
pose of that one science.
It is elementary, but important to reiterate that
every science makes assumptions in advance of
certainty. These are methodological assumptions
which even ifproven to be heuristic for the purpose
ofaninvestigation are not necessarily "true" forthe
purpose ofother investigations and, ifthey are, not
necessarily true of all reality.
We do not question the truth of a mathematical
entity, provided that it is self-consistent. But we
must continually question the veracity of a system
intowhichwe place empirical constants, orinterpret
the signs and symbols, e.g. give them conventional
meaning. We question by constant reference to ex-
perience.
Woodger (4) clearly propounds such an approach
for biology from which we can learn:
"It is without sense to ask whether the axioms in
an uninterpreted system are true, and all that is
meant by saying that the theorems are true is that
they are derivable from the axioms in accordance
with the rules of inference adopted, i.e. rules for
transforming one sentence in the system into
another. Such a system becomes of interest to
natural science if, on substituting empirical con-
stants for its variable, we obtain significant sen-
tences that are not contradicted by observation."
Evenfromthetheoretical standpoint, thepractical
activity is the only ultimate source ofstatement vali-
dation. With respect to the system per se, the
analytical roleofthe rules is the source ofvalidation;
butifsuch statements ortheirconsequences can not
be empirically confirmed, then both the rules and
axioms may be changed to "fit" the system to use.
This confers upon the scientist order to his records,
direction to his activities, and an analytic tool useful
in expanding the data base and our conceptual hori-
zons.
Some statements in such a system can not be
verified, butfindjustification fortheircontinued use
to be their systematizing value. They become
methodological contrivances. The meaning of such
devices is confined to their systematizing function.
This is not always recognized by the practical
worker, whofinds it necessary to make an imaginary
extension of such unverifiable entities to reality.
Gehring (5) uses barrels with triangular slits, for
example, to provide "a conceptual basis" . . . "for
why metabolic thresholds may lead to a dispro-
portionate increase in toxicity. ..." This kind of
extension should not lead to controversy about the
reality and characteristics of such entities, yet their
use inOSHA hearings tojustify the continued use of
the 'TLV' concept (6) in the control of workplace
carcinogens has had precisely this result.
In economics, a similar extension ofthe imagina-
tion takes place when the concept or model of the
free marketplace is assumed or used.
Knight (7) lists the characteristics of such a
system: freely contracting individuals, perfectly ra-
tional behavior, perfect mobility, complete knowl-
edge of exchange possibilities and technical signifi-
cance, ideal wants, free access to market, purely
individual desires, free banking and currency, indi-
vidual provision for the future, a rational attitude
toward risk and chance, and perfect distribution of
rewards according to productive contribution. This
concept can not survive the test of real life.
Dosuchextensionstake placejusttosystemize? A
parableby Kafka (8) is brought to mind by this ques-
tion: "Since the Fall we have been essentially equal
in our capacity to recognize good and evil," he be-
gins. He goes on to say: ". . . nobody can remain
contentwith the mere knowledge ofgood and evil in
itself, but must endeavour to act in accordance with
it." Inthis attempt, he concludes, "man isfilledwith
fear; he prefers to annul his knowledge . . . yet the
accomplished cannot be annulled, but only con-
fused. It was for this purpose that our rationaliza-
tions were created. The whole world is full ofthem,
indeed the whole visible world is perhaps nothing
more than the rationalization ofa man who wants to
find peace of a moment."
Mostcommunication isthe processoftransmitting
not knowledge, but rationalization or the imaginary
extension to reality.
Ifsuchcommunication is rejected bythe proposed
receptor, not simply the message but even the
medium, then the perception-polarized by reality
- is protective. In the case ofthe issue ofthe envi-
ronment ofworkplace or community, what is being
protected may be life itself.
Rationalizations take different forms. They may
be simply construed imaginary extensions, or they
may be complex constructions from carefully
selected data. In occupational health decisions, the
onlyprotection the worker has againsteitherform is
his own reality, the reality he is able to perceive.
Here an important distinction must be made be-
tween various frames ofdiscourse, because what is
"'right" and "wrong" (in this context) is relative to
its discursive frame. Some frames are axiomatic
systemsorsubsystems. Others arewithoutsufficient
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rough areas of discussion.
Thisisadifficultconcepttograsp, soconcreteness
may be helpful. If, for example, the issues in the
discourse involve simply construed extensions of
ourimagination(theexistence ofsafetyorthresholds
for populations) or complex constructions (such as
the concept of "acceptable risk," the use of "risk-
benefit analysis" when dealing with incommensura-
bles, or the alleged prevalence of the demand for a
"zero riskenvironment"), then the discourse can go
forward but only by making believe, by playing a
game in which we speak as if our statements are
verifiable.
To avoid semilogical fallacies (which occur when
the same term in the same context isgiven more than
one meaning) we learn to accommodate our mean-
ings inany dialogue so that the denotation (including
the qualifications) of the term, for the purpose of
dialogue, becomes the same orsimilarin meaningfor
each actor. For at least one participant in the
dialogue (usually all) the meaning of the concept
actually changes. So we continuously hear implied
or explicated redefinitions of "risk-benefit anal-
ysis," a process which is essential to communica-
tion. Within the frame of that dialogue, when the
adjustment has been made, the acceptance and use
ofthe concept is "right," i.e., an heuristic method-
ological assumption has been made by at least one
actor, an assumption that need not "fit".
Thedifficulty isthatwhenthe conceptisdiscussed
in the broader, public frame of discourse a de-
notive-connotative fallacy may occur. Thatis to say,
the denotative meanings - private redefinitions
conflict with the broader, public connotative mean-
inggiven the terms by observers ofthedialogue who
have not orcan notbecognizant ofthe methodologi-
cal use or redefinition. Within that frame, the ac-
ceptance and use ofthe concept is "wrong" because
it is known by the actors to be extended beyond the
meaningofthe term as a systematizerforthe sake of
discussion.
Since dialogue or communication becomes less
effective asthenumberofpeopleinvolvedincreases,
we must reject the use ofterms that require massive
re-education forits redefinition. The solution is sim-
ply to find another term.
In the recent OSHA cancer policy hearings, I
questioned Upton (NCI), Rall (NIEHS), and
Schneiderman (NCI) on what each meant by risk-
benefit analysis (a term they each used). Confronted
with the conventional meanings, they essentially
agreed with Rall that another term would be more
useful in conveying their position on the social,
decision-making process of carcinogen regulation.
Perpetuating the conventional meaning of
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''cause" in discursive frames where "factor" would
be more appropriate is another example. The con-
ventional meaning of "cause" is essentially New-
tonian: stressing the agentive and material sides of
Act and Effect. The concept favors the explanation
ofthe action ofsingle agents ormechanisms in isola-
tion; it has difficulty in accounting for statistical,
multi-variate factoranalysis. Yet, as we know, these
concepts are both heuristic within an appropriate
frame of discourse. The study of pharmaco-kinetic
pathways fruitfully have assumed Newtonian cause
andeffect relationships. Population studies (e.g. risk
assessments) fruitfully have assumed chance re-
lationships.
There has not yet been abroad realization that the
concepts of safety, thresholds of "no effects" in
populations, one-cause and one-effect are often not
heuristic. Our failure to find heuristic alternative
tools means the perpetuation of overly simplistic
regulatory concepts which we cannot abandon be-
cause we have no replacement. What is widely sug-
gested for filling the void really fills the pots of the
latter-day cannibal: the concept of acceptable risk.
The connotation ofthe term "acceptable risk" is
intellectually and emotionally appealing. When a
taskforce (9) of respected government scientists,
having failed to find either the empirical or theoreti-
calbasesfor"thresholds," suggested to regulators a
socioeconomic solution for determining the allowa-
ble extent ofcarcinogenic exposure, they suggested
the method of "socially acceptable risk."
At that time the concept had very little meaning
because there was little effort to develop a
methodology for the determination of such risks.
Subsequent work has provided us with a profuse
literature, ofwhich this paper is a part. Based on the
recent denotation, the term has lost its appeal.
Those who espouse the prevalent concept of ac-
ceptable riskgenerally assume anumberoffallacies,
including: (1) that the persistence of a risk is evi-
dence that it has been accepted by those at risk,
(apathy, ignorance and lack ofchoice notwithstand-
ing), and (2) the process ofdecidingwhether or not a
risk will be taken is on the basis of cost-benefit
analysis, an analog of the primitive utilitatianism:
"the greatest good for the greatest number." In this
process the worker fares poorly; he is selected for
unnecessary and unwarranted risks; he is can-
nibalized.
Lowrance (10), whose work appears to be quoted
most frequently, depends substantively on an as-
sessment of attitudes among those at risk: "Our
attitudesaboutrisks and ourassignment ofresponsi-
bility for minimizing them still seem to be imbal-
anced by whetherthey are encountered on oroffthe
job."
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whatthe perceptor believes to be "the facts" (10). If
by safety we mean no observed adverse effects, a
"threshold" would mean alevelofdosebelow which
there is no sucheffect. The case hasoften been made
that no threshold has been found for chemical or
radiation carcinogenesis or mutagenesis. Lowrance
makesthe case, with Stokinger(6), inconsistentwith
the uniformity of nature, that thresholds "clearly"
exist for noncarcinogenic risks. Others dispute this
"fact."
Rall (11), observing the effects of sulfur oxides,
believesthat "the concept ofno-effectlevel may be a
chimera." An isolated opinion? A committee ofthe
National Academy of Science concludes, in assess-
ing the risk oftoxic chemicals, that "(the term 'no-
effect level') is statistically meaningless . . ." (12).
What happens, for the purpose ofdialogue, when
we redefine "safety" to mean "risks . . . judged to
be acceptable." (10) is that, aside from the risk of a
denotative-connative fallacy, the attitude of
separating risks "on" or "off' the job becomes a
critical consideration.
Toquote Lowrance (JO), "Ithastraditionally been
accepted that pursuing one's trade will almost in-
evitablybringapeculiar set ofrisks, andfurther, that
such risks may allowably be greater than for non-
occupational activities. This attitude has strong his-
torical momentum."
The "momentum" is a fact, the attitude that it is
"generally agreed" that most industrial accidents
(and even a large number of illnesses) are precipi-
tatedby "ignorance, absent mindedness, negligence
andfoolhardiness" (10) may not be afact. The presi-
dent of the American Society for Safety Engineers
(13), for instance, takes issue with Lowrance: "In-
stead . . . it is generally agreed that most accidents
are associated with multiple causal factors, some
relating to the actions of people."
Aside from the question of the pseudo-historic
acceptability of occupational risks, even the as-
sumption of such acceptability in the past is not a
premise in its acceptability in the future. It is a pre-
mise forthe creation ofaclass ofexpendables allow-
ably selected for sacrifice by society.
Part ofthe rationale for the sacrifice is an attempt
to give credence to the myth of risk willingness,
demonstrated by comparing unregulated risks
through loose analogy with incommensurable situa-
tions proposed for regulation. Pochin (14) compares
sports spectacles withnuclearriskwithoccupational
risk. Part ofthe rationale is found at the very base of
thetrulyhistoricdialogue ontheregulation ofhuman
behavior: the blind acceptance ofthe greatest good
for the greatest number.
Thegreatestgood(determined by special interests
in aposition to have social leverage) for the greatest
number (without regard for the welfare of the less
powerful few) means precisely that form of collec-
tivetyrannywhichwe as asociety supposedly reject.
It is a game in which the rules can be changed at the
will ofthe most lawless players regardless ofthe toll
in human life or the distortion of the humblest con-
cept of truth.
Ironically, it can result in precisely those des-
potisms most feared by the well-meaning utilitarian
progenitors of some of the concepts abused in this
game.
The key concept was expressed in the context of
the Industrial Revolution and the concurrent surge
toward confusing quantification with science by the
primitive utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (15).
"Take an account ofthe number ofpersons ... concerned
... sum up the numbers expressive ... ofgood tendency ..
with respect to each individual . . ; do this again with respect
to (the) bad. Take the balance; which, if on the side of plea-
sure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with
respect to the total number or community of individuals con-
cerned; ifon the side ofpain, the general evil tendency, with
respect to the same community."
His "felicific" calculus, reducing collective good
andbad toquantified common valuesofpleasure and
pain, the ancestor ofcost-benefit analysis, was later
qualified by Mill (16).
"The great majority ofgood actions are intended notforthe
benefit of the world, but for that of individuals ... the
thoughtsofthe most virtuous man need not ... travel beyond
theparticularpersons concerned, except sofaras isnecessary
toassure himselfthat in benefittingthem he is not violatingthe
fights, that is, the legitimate and authorized expectations, of
anyone else."
Cost-benefit analysis, as defined by Rowe, (17), is
"an attempt to delineate and compare in terms of
society as a whole the significant effects, both posi-
tive and negative, of a specific action. Generally a
numberofalternative actions are analyzed, resulting
inthe selection ofthe alternative thatprovideseither
the largest benefit-cost ratio (total benefit/to total
cost) or one with a positive ratio at least...
Epstein (18) uses the concepts of "efficacy" and
"social utility" in matching benefits against hazards
for the purpose of simplifying "the benefit hazard
equation."
The definition thus far is Bentham's felicific cal-
culus. The Mill qualification appears in Rowe as
"inequities reasonably ameliorated" (17). The same
qualification appears in Mishan's (19) cogent defini-
tion: "The rational ofexisting cost-benefitcriteria is
ultimately that ofa potential pareto improvement."
By pareto improvement he means a change in eco-
nomicorganization that makes one ormore members
of society better off without making anyone worse
off.
Neither Rowe nor Epstein nor Mishan see cost-
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ment ofour population for the sake of another. The
problem is how to determine the "inequities" or
calculate the "worse off."
Rowe suggests a number of approaches to the
problem of equity, including the work of physicist
Richard Wilson.
In Wilson's testimony at the OSHA hearings on
carcinogen policy (20), on behalf of the American
Industrial Health Council, a chemical industry
group, he said that the pareto consideration was too
complicated. His direct testimony provides us with
this simpler concept: ". . . are the benefits properly
disaggregated ... do enough ... accrue to those
directly undertaking the risks? This can, in an ex-
treme case be by compensation of hazard pay."
Hazard pay - in a society that historically prides
itself in a less than full employment economy and
where risks are seldom undertaken voluntarily - is
the conventional expression of cannibalism in
America.
Testifying at the same hearing for the American
Petroleum Institute, economist Richard Zeckhauser
took a diffferent position (21).
the agency argues (that) cost-benefit
analysis (is) inappropriate. We would agree that
health is not a traditional commodity and that there
are no widely accepted techniques forassigning dol-
larvaluestohealthoutcomes . .. We are notarguing
that a cost-benefit approach be employed in for-
mulating policy on occupational safety and health."
Professor Zeckhauser argued for a defensible cost-
effectiveness approach.
Even if one were to assume that an individual
really has a choice, shifting the question from can-
nibalism to suicide, problems remain.
Mishan notes (19) that "in determining whether
a potential pareto improvement has been met,
economists are generally agreed -either as acanon
offaith, asapolitical tenet, oras anactofexpediency
- to accept the dictum that each person knows his
own interest best."
Aside from the question of whether such knowl-
edge is possible, given the reality that each man has
imperfect knowledge, Mishan makes the historic as-
sumption about economic man, stated very early by
Edgeworth(22): "Thefirst principleofEconomics is
that every agent is actuated only by self-interest."
In otherwords, cost benefit analysis assumes that
altruism either does not exist or is an unimportant
factor. It assumes that the agent knows his self-
interest and acts rationally in accordance with this
knowledge. These assumptions are unheuristic.
They are not warrantable in either the best or (de-
pending on your Weltanschauung) the worst of all
possible worlds. These are not the only assumptions
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ofan unheuristic nature made in cost or risk-benefit
analysis.
Incost orrisk-benefit analysis, we have displayed
before us a system of forced quantification which
often leads to what Georgescu-Roegen (23) calls the
Arithmomorphic Model or what I call the Arithcen-
tric Fallacy: numbers = precision, precision = truth,
ergo numbers = truth.
Morethanhalfacentury ago Viner(24)warned his
fellow economists against the "all too prevalent
methodological fanaticism which prefers the accu-
rate but superficial to the approximate but funda-
mental, and which makes adaptability to its special
technique of investigation, rather than importance,
the standard for the selection of problems and the
delineation of the scope of its inquiry."
Despite these warnings, the arithcentric fallacy is
frequently displayed in ignoring the necessity of
commensurable values in a calculus. Thus we find
risk-benefit proponents (25) comparing the risks of
saccharinwithcigarette smokingwith streetcrossing
with automobile riding with the risk of cervical
canceramongwomenwhodonothaveanannual test
- all for the sake of quantification for the sake of
risk-benefit analysis presumably for the sake of
finding the elusive "acceptable risk."
Wilson correctly compares (20) the risks of x-ray
and the benefits (averting another risk) of disease
diagnosis because the same person is involved and
the risks and benefits have a common value: longev-
ity of that one individual.
But for the sake of quantification he equates as-
sessments that have no common values. He ex-
trapolates without qualification data from animal
studies (20) for the quantification ofhuman risk. He
makesthe sameerrorinextrapolatingandcomparing
data from epidemiologic studies (20), confusing the
risk of asbestos-exposed smokers and asbestos-
exposednonsmokers. Inthe caseheuses, theratioof
observed to expected has as its denominator white
male death rates of smokers and nonsmokers taken
from the national rate. Thus for lung cancer among
asbestos-exposed noncigarette smokers the ratio is
2/1.58 (20). In testimony before the same hearing,
Selikoff introduced another study in which the de-
nominator is (a) matched to the asbestos worker
cohort and (b) compares nonsmokers to non-
smokers. Understandably, the ratio derived is dif-
ferent: 4-5/1. Which one describes the risk? The risk
ofasbestos exposure for the individual is indetermi-
nate if it is not relative because it is absolute. The
calculation of absolute values is not possible. The
comparison of ratios whose denominators have no
common value is not possible.
Nevertheless, from this exercise in quantification
Wilson derives an "acceptable" numerical level or
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"table" (20) compares questionable "accident"
rates with mixed questionable "accident" and dis-
easerates andlabelsthemall "CurrentOccupational
Risks." Hecalculatesfromthis nonsense athreshold
"yearly risk less than 10-5/ year as one in which the
reduction can be left to industry but that OSHA
action would almost inevitably cost more than is
justified" (20).
Even if the methodological errors of Wilson are
corrected, the problems ofsubjectivism in a statisti-
cal calculus for decision-making remain. Tversky
and Kahneman (26) make the pointthatinternal con-
sistency is not the only criterion to evaluatejudged
probabilities. "The judgments must be compatible
withtheentire webofbeliefs heldbytheindividual."
The failure in economic judgments to follow
Viner's advice is found less among economists than
itisamongothers who use the arithcentric technique
withoutunderstanding. A committee ofthe National
Academy of Sciences (27) taking the advice of its
economist-members, concluded: "We have found
traditional benefit-cost analysis to be not very useful
in making decisions about regulating chemicals. The
most important and pervasive limitation on benefit-
costanalysisisthe roleofvalues. Manyofthefactors
that are likely to be most significant in a decision
concerning toxic chemicals cannot be measured in
common terms (such as dollars) that are agreeable to
all concerned parties...."
These are not arguments against increasing the
precision withwhich we make biological riskoreco-
nomic (or even social) benefit assessments in order
to achieve a balance of judgment. What is being
questioned is how and in what form the data can be
developed andused. We cannotignore values simply
because we cannot quantify them, or distort them
throughmeaninglessquantification andcomparison.
Read the new literature ofderegulation: "What is
alife worth?", etcetera. What weread, all toooften,
isreminiscent ofthe Renaissance fairy tale aboutthe
number of angels that can dance on the point of a
needle that supposedly pre-occupied medieval phi-
losophy.
What we do not read is a rich literature that was
ancient by the time Aristotle noted that "it is the
markofaneducated mantolookforprecision ineach
class ofthingsjust so far as the nature ofthe subject
admits.. .9" (28).
Inadministrative hearings, briefs submitted in liti-
gation and in nearly any Washington-focused forum
the latter-day sophist can be found taking advantage
of the utilitarian, albeit superficial utilitarian, pol-
tergeist that has dominated governmental thinking
for the past quarter century.
What are our alternatives?
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Bentham'sfelicificcalculus (cost-benefit analysis)
even with Mill's qualification (the pareto considera-
tion) has little utility in environmental decision-
making, because every environmental decision af-
fects someone or some group whose rights and
expectations are threatened. Fortunately, there is a
moral reality which operates in our society, an his-
torical reality.
In any viable society, the first principle of any
ethical system must be the biblical (not necessarily
biblicallyjustified) injunction (29) to choose life and
its preservation as the means by which to choose
right and wrong. This is the basic principle from
which all others emanate, including those moral
dicta called rights, without which no human society
has, could or should survive. Those who recognize
the primacy ofthat principle represent a wide spec-
trum: witness Spinoza's liberty to preserve man's
own existence, Jefferson's location ofnatural rights
in the need for existence, and Freud's identification
ofthe true life instincts with the conservative sexual
instinct to preserve life itself.
Thus, a citizen's right to assure that his govern-
ment attempts to ban the unnecessary proliferation
ofcarcinogens infood (forexample) derivesfrom his
needforthisprotection. This and all rightsarisefrom
the need to preserve life. This is the historic basis of
the Delaney and other regulatory devices, not risk-
benefit analysis in the parlor game of "acceptable
risk." Thefactthatwe often do notchoose life is not
an argumentforthe acceptance ofrisk. Itis, instead,
an argument for asking how to reduce risk.
One possible answer is in a concept of necessary
risk, based on discoverable historical reality, that is,
theneed tochoose lifeutilizing nottheform ofpreci-
sion identified with mere numbers but the substance
of precision through the development of analytic
tools consistent with the dialectics of democracy.
To merely suggest this on issues of the environ-
ment of the workplace and community is to elicit
charges of"Congressional interference" and "emo-
tional publicity." But these come from those who
don'tunderstandorchoose notto acceptthe process
bywhichdecisions havetobe madeinademocracy.
Can such aprinciple become an axiom in a science
ofhealthdecision? A single calculus ofobjective and
subjective values may not be possible, buta seriesof
calculi utilized dialectically is worthy ofexploration
if we can discipline ourselves to understand the
limitations of an exercise in the mathematics of
chance as part of the process of making decisions
about who shall live and who shall die.
In this exploration, "we must believe in science,
i.e., in determinism; we must believe in a complete
and necessary relation between things, among the
phenomena proper to living beings as well as in all
Environmental Health Perspectivesothers; but at the same time we must be thoroughly
convinced that we know this relation only in a more
or less approximate way, and that the theories we
holdarefarfromembodyingchangelesstruths" (30).
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